The Struggle to Preserve Iowa's State Banking System, 1920 System, -1933 CALVIN W. COQUILLETTE
"It is as if the manufacturers of old oaken buckets had gotten laws passed to prohibit the establishment of municipal water systems."Û
NLIKE THE BANKING SYSTEM of any other developed country, the U.S. banking system was (and is) composed of two systems: one is made up of nafional banks, chartered and examined by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, in which all bariks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve System; the other exists in each state wherein banks are chartered by a state bank superintendent. State-chartered banks may elect to join the Federal Reserve System, but in the 1920s and the early years of the Great Depression, most did not. Statechartered banks and bankers associafions struggled to preserve their state banking systems at a fime when the two most divisive issues ini the history of twenfieth-century American banking converged: the permissibility of interstate branch banking and the federal guarantee of bank deposits. A study of Iowa's banking condifions during the 1920s and early 1930s suggests why most bankers fought so hard to resist branch banking and the federal deposit guarantee.
The characterisfic feature of the American banking system was the predominance of separately owned, independently chartered xmit banks, which could be either state or nafional barJss. Such banks had no branches, no bank affiliates, and no corporate headquarters located elsewhere. The state-chartered vmit bank was the linchpin of the nafion's banking system, aided by two powerful allies in every state: the state bankers associafion and the state superintendent of banking. The Iowa Bankers Associafion (IBA) represented 99 percent of all Iowa banks in 1920, state and nafional alike, and the Iowa Superintendent of Banking, a state govemment official, was responsible for 1,346 state-chartered banks with deposits of $658 million. Including its nafional banks, deposits in Iowa exceeded $1 billion in 1920, a total not to be equaled again unfil 1940.Â s Iowa led the nafion in bank failures from 1921 through 1931, with an average of 87 per year, its state banking system came under attack.^ The nub of the controversy over Iowa's excessive rate of bank failures was whether the state's banking system or agricultural deflafion was more to blame. At the nafional level, reformers proposed such reforms as eliminating the longstanding prohibifion against branch banking and insfituting a federal deposit guarantee.
Iowa bankers vigorously opposed such reforms and, at the annual convenfions of the IBA, reinforced the sancfity of the independent unit bank and the state banking system. One speaker objected that critics charged bank failures up as "a crime against the unit bank." If it was suggested that the small bank "might have outlived some of its usefulness," Iowa bankers asked where else the "character loan"-a loan without capital or collateral-could be obtained?^ If federal reform of the nafion's dual banking system was proposed, it could only come over the howls of protest from state bank superintendents, state barikers associafions, and thousands of country bankers in Iowa and across the country. Far too many cifizens (and voters) con-sidered their farm community, their local bank, and their state banking system to be inviolate. THE PROBLEM OF BANK FAILURES predated the Great Depression in the upper Midwest. Bank failures in the farm states reflected the dropping commodity prices of crops and livestock. Com and hogs were especially hard hit. Iowa's dependence on com and hogs meant that Iowa farmers and farm banks were more exposed to the severe farm price deflation that began in the 1920s.
Price deflation and farm failures, combined with the problem of farm mortgage debt, proved to be especially burdensome for Iowa farmers, bankers, and other lenders. By 1925, total U.S. farm mortgage debt was $9.4 billion; Iowa's total was $1.4 billion, or 15 percent of the nation's total. By 1930, only five states other than Iowa-^Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Texas-^had farm mortgage debt in excess of $500 million, and none of those states had even half of Iowa's amount.' Because farm mortgage debt totaled about 70 percent of total farm indebtedness, and because double the dollar amount of Iowa farmland was mortgaged compared to the next highest states, Iowa farmers carried much higher debt burdens than farmers elsewhere.
Banking conditions in Iowa and the upper Midwest reflected the agricultural crisis of the 1920s. While total U.S. bank deposits increased by 40 percent from 1922 to 1930, the banks in the upper Midwest experienced a deposit decline of 6 percent.* Total Iowa bank deposits declined during that period by 8.5 percent. Deposits in state-chartered Iowa banks declined even more, from $658 million to $563 million, or 14 percent, while the number of state-chartered banks dropped by almost 300.' The top five states with the most bank failures in the 1920s were, in rarik order: Iowa, North Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Nebraska. Although banks in these five states accounted for only slightly more than 6 percent of total bank deposits, they contained 24 percent of all banks in the United States. Most of the failed banks were small state-chartered banks that served small farm commvinities with populations of less than 2,500. A Federal Reserve Board study noted that "one town in Iowa with a population of 1,300 had four banks in 1920.... one county in Nortii Dakota witii a population of 10,000 had 16 banks."' By mid-1930 the president of the Iowa Bankers Association noted that, in spite of the stock market crash the previous October, Iowa farms and farm banks had been through the worst. "Probably no state in the Urüon," he said, "has suffered more at the hands of national psychology or from national observation than this state, whose name has been dragged about in a most wanton fashion."' Yet in the fourth quarter of 1930 the nationwide bank failvire rate accelerated dramatically. Increased bank failures in Iowa refiected the further decline in key farm prices. The price per bushel of com was 92 cents in September, fell to 55 cents in December, and declined steadily thereafter for the next 30 months. Hogs were $9.45 per hundredweight in late November, but dropped $2.50 by tíie end of the year. In the fourth quarter of 1930, bank deposits nationwide declined by $915 million (4.7%), and hundreds of banks failed, only to set the stage for 1931, when more than two thousand failed. As the public became more fearful of bar\ks, people began to hoard currency, and currency in circulation declined by about $800 million."" 7. Many more than 300 state-chartered banks failed during that time, but many were reborn or chartered anew under new names and new ownership. BECAUSE none of the five states with the most barJ< failures in the 1920s permitted any form of branch banking, contemporary critics (and subsequent historians) suggested that the number of unit bank failures might have been significantly reduced had branch banking been permitted for all banks prior to 1920." But small vmit bankers in Iowa, fearing that interstate branch banking would allow big banks to compete directly in any unit bank's trade area, perceived branch banking to be tiie most immediate threat to their state bar\king system, and they fought to preserve unit banks as the backbone of that system." In short, proponents of branch banking proclaimed it to be the panacea for reducing or eliminating bank failures. Small unit banks, iri contrast, feared a concentration of banking resources in a handful of giant interstate banks. While the argument raged from 1921 to 1931, a total of 9,355 banks failed nafionwide.
The branch banking controversy was not new to the industry. Annual conventions of the American Bankers Association (ABA) periodically resolved to oppose branch banking in dues, counties, or states. A speaker at the 1922 ABA convention portrayed branch banking as monopolistic and oppressive; it threatened American banking "freedom" and was nothing less than a "ca- System, 1900 -1929 , 1983), 221. White argues that branch banking would have "reduced the number of barJss and facilitated banks' mutual assistance in times of crisis." Independent unit banks feared a reduction in their numbers through branch banking, especially if branching were to occur across state lines. Branch banking would have been a more viable expansion alternative in 1900-1929 than in the early years of the Great Depression, when branch banking networks contracted. Permitting branch banking after 1930 would have had little or no effect in a time of deposit deflation, currency hoarding, mounting loan losses, and "red ink." 12. Branch barJdng was not uniformly opposed by all state banks. In states where statewide branching was permitted, state banks led the way because national banks were prohibited to branch until 1927. That prohibition stemmed from the original National Bank Act of 1863. Section 6 stated that persons forming a national bank association had to specify the place where its "operation of discount and deposit are to be carried on"; and Section 8 provided that its usual business shall be transacted "in the place specified in the organization certificate" (emphases added).
lamity."" Legislators found such rhetoric persuasive. Nafional banks were prohibited from establishing full-service branches vrnfil 1927. In 1930 only rune states permitted unlimited statewide branch banking, while 22 prohibited it outright. The remainder either restricted branches to the county, city, town, or village in which the main bank was located (10 states) or had no legislafion regarding branch banking (7 states)." When proponents of branch bariking argued that nafional banks in states that allowed branching should at least be allowed to establish branches in the city where they were established, the ABA resolved that all forms of branch banking should be regarded as "detrimental to the people of the United States."" Iowa bankers had long believed that branch banking would be detrimental to their state banking system; in the spring of 1921, the Iowa legislature, bowing to pressure from the IBA, had voted almost unanimously to prohibit any form of branch bariking within the state.
During the 1920s, many nafional banks in states that permitted branch banking surrendered their federal charters in favor of state charters in order to establish branches. Regulators of nafional banks feared an erosion of their authority and lobbied for passage of the McFadden Act. When it passed in 1927, nafional banks were permitted to establish full-service branches in their home-office cifies if state banks were permitted to do so. But in Iow^a, as in 22 other states, the prohibifion against most forms of branch banking meant that nafional banks were restricted just as its state banks were."
The McFadden Act could be seen as a victory for urüt banks in the anfi-branching states because branch bariks were sfiU effecfively precluded in those states. This troubled the Federal Reserve staff, who objected that nafional banking laws were "adjusted to standards set by various states.""' Iowa bankers preferred to mold their own destiny apart from the federal govemment or Federal Reserve System. State bank legislafion was designed to preserve and enhance the Iowa state banking system and not risk encroachment from federal authorifies or banks in other states.
When the U.S. House Banking Committee opened hearings on branch banking in 1930, Iowa bankers became concemed. The U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, John Pole, whose office regulated and examined all nafional banks, was troubled by three recent developments. First, the McFadden Act of 1927 had not settled the branch bank question. National banks continued to desert in favor of state bank charters. Second, bank failures nafionwide since 1920 had cost $1.7 billion in total deposits ($201 million from Iowa banks)." Third, the development of "group banking" was perceived by some observers to be a way to circumvent anfi-branching laws. ("Three years ago, unnoficed and unremarked," Pole exclaimed, "today it controls onefifth of the nafion's banking resources!"")
In response to a survey on group banking in Iowa, IBA Secretary Frank Warner noted that in January 1929 the Northwestem Nafional Bank of Minneapolis had organized a bank holding company (known as "Banco") that owned the stock of the Minneapolis bank. By year-end it had acquired the stock of 105 barücs in eight states representing $470 million in total assets. The corporafion (later "Norwest" and now "Wells Fargo") acquired Iowa's largest bank in Des Moines as well as two banks in Mason City, one in Sioux City, and one in Denison. Its primary compefitor, the First Nafional Bank of Minneapolis, had formed the First Bank Stock Corporafion and reported 85 bank affiliates in 7 states with $433 million in total assets.^" Warner speculated that certain group banks or their officers might attempt to gain control of tiie IBA; or that Iowa independent unit banks would spin off into a separate association and thus fragment the Iowa banking system; or that group banking would become a backdoor entry to branch banking as affiliates converted to branches of the lead banks when the law permitted. George Susens of the Minnesota Bankers Association admitted that some small independent banks felt that the MBA was dominated by the Minneapolis banks. But "most of our country bankers think that nothing will stop group banking or even branch banking."^'
Branch banking, whatever its form, inevitably became entangled with the problem of bank failures. Most failed banks were small, independent state banks in farm communities, supported by their state bankers associations and state banking departments. Almost two-thirds were banks with capital of $25,000 or less. A Federal Reserve study concluded that "a direct and unmistakable relationship exists between the size of banks, their earning power and mortality rate."" One critic compared the unit bank and its supporters to a manufacturer of "old oaken buckets" determined to prevent the development of municipal water systems." Independent unit bankers resented such criticism. They argued that excessive bank failures did not call for abandonment of unit banks or the ir\stigation of interstate branch banking. Bank failures, they insisted, were due to farm conditions. The remedy, therefore, was to stabilize agriculture, not reform the state banking systems. Proponents of branch barüdng, on the other hand, tended to represent urban banks and care littie about agriculture. They pointed to the banking system in Canada, where there was a grand total of ten banks: one had two branches and the other nine had 140 to 880 branches each. There, bank failures had been minimal compared to the United States. Certainly, replied the opponents of branching, and look at Canada and ¿le Canadian economy: vast tracts of undeveloped wasteland, a glut of depressed wheat stocks, and a banking cartel with no competition. There was no place for the "character" loan in conservative Canadian banking and no place for traditional American autonomy and individuality. Unlike Canada, about 70 percent of Iowa hank stockholders resided in the bank's hometown. Local citizens had a vested interest in the local bank's survival and prosperity." At year-end 1931, proponents of branch banking and defenders of unit banking remained divided.
MEANWHILE, President Herbert Hoover had become convinced, as he told the nation on radio, that "the battiefront today is against the hoarding of currency."^ Bank failures had resvilted in increased hoarding of money in backyards and linder mattresses and finally forced Hoover's hand. In September 1931 he had learned that the amount of hoarded currency was a "rocksolid" $800 million and growing at the projected rate of $250 million per week." The amount and rate of hoarding could be correlated to the numbers and frequency of barü< failures, and the problem intensified. While Hoover believed that the bank failure rate might be checked through loans to marginal banks from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which he proposed a few months later, he also believed that currency hoarding provided an opportunity to organize and mobilize a citizens' army to promote patriotism and economic nationalism.^'T he Hoover campaign against hoarding began in February 1932 with a well-publicized White House conference. The conference became a virtual declaration of war against the estimated $1.5 billion being hoarded. General Charles Dawes, head of the new RFC, proclaimed that because "millions of people [hoarders] are slowly committing economic suicide," it was now necessary to "reach out and create mass movement in this war." Julius Barnes, president of the National Chamber of Commerce, wanted assurance "that money deposited in the bank carries some measure of safety." Harry Haas, president of the ABA, suggested that the banks' role in the campaign against hoarding might be awkward. "If the banks shovild start such a program," he explained, "then the public would say they have a selfish motive because they want to get the deposits."^'
Hoover took the campaign against hoarding to heart. He appointed Colonel Frarik Knox, publisher of the Chicago Daily News, to head the campaign and "to reawaken a new spirit in a nation which is now vastly discouraged."" At Hoover's urging and within one week, Knox had selected a chairman for each state and had produced six "very striking" full-page ads that he expected some 400 newspapers to run as a public service.^" He selected Colonel Charles Burton Robbins, former assistant secretary of war and president of the Cedar Rapids Life Irisurance Company, to chair the campaign's "Iowa Department." Robbins enlisted "Minute Men," including many Iowa bankers, who signed pledge cards available in banks and post offices. Minute Men (and women, also known as "Minute Men") pledged to "place the general welfare of IOWA first, to talk construcfively, to work zealously to restore confidence, and to execute any orders given to me by my superior officers."^' Some 25,000 Iowans enlisted as Minute Men. Their mission was to rebuild confidence and restore momentum to the local economy.
The nafional campaign also included a special Treasury bond issue to be offered to hoarders who feared banks. IBA Secretary Warner lamented the "disadvantages that banks would be in if the contemplated bonds were sold in a house-to-house canvass." He spoke for most Iowa banks when he said that "the [bond] campaign might result in the loss of their deposits, and this campaign would be just one more thing to make it difficult for the small rviral bank to survive." The Chicago Tribune agreed that "the bonds may draw as much from deposits in banks as from hiding places in the home." Sale of the bonds never materialized in quanfity. The IBA advised its member banks to "not take too aggressive a part."'T he campaign against hoarding had only limited success. Colonel Knox esfimated that $201 million had been redeposited in banks by March 26." But deposits in all U.S. barücs for the first six months of 1932 declined fi-om $45.8 billion to $42 billion, or 8.3 percent. In Iowa the decline was even more severe at 17 percent. While nafional hank deposits in Iowa declined by 14 percent, deposits in state-chartered barücs, represenfing more than eight out of ten rural banks, declined by 19 percent. Deposits in state-chartered banks in all other states declined by orüy 7.7 percent.'* In large part the legacy of the anfi-hoarding campaign was continued depression and the federal guarantee of bank deposits that came about in 1933. THE PRIMARY BARRIER to the success of the anti-hoarding campaign was that depositors had no assurance of safety in banks. Someone suggested that the federal govemment should promote its own safe altemative for those who feared banksthe Postal Savings System. Postal savings accounts, which paid 2 percent interest, were a^vailable in every post office; deposits, which were guaranteed by the federal govemment, were restricted to $2,500 per account. Bankers had fought against their instigation in 1916 and remained opposed to them in 1932. Knowing that bankers would vehemently object to the suggestion. Hoover quickly pointed out why the anti-hoarding campaign should not endorse postal savings accounts.
I can illustrate ... by recounting the experience of a town in Texas where there was a run on one bank out of the four. The postmaster wanted to be helpful, and stated that if anyone was not satisfied with the safety of his deposits he could bring his money to the post office, since there the United States govemnient guaranteed the deposit. Within three hours, every barik in the town was closed and the post office had all their cash resources. I have felt, therefore, that the most dangerous thing we could say to the whole country is that they should take their money and put it in the postal savings bank, because they will take deposits from the present banks, as well as their hoarded money. represented a higher percentage of total bank deposits than in any other state. The per capita deposit average was $9.51, double the national average of $4.72. Keokuk banker Bill Logan referred to "many smaller towns in Iowa where Postal Savings deposits exceed the bank deposits by many times."''
The ABA fought hard against congressional irütiaüves to raise the permissible per account balance for Postal Savings deposits from $2,500 to $10,000 and to permit checking privileges. Bill Logan applauded the ABA's success. He believed tiiat postal savings was nothing more than federal branch banking.'P ostal savings, as Hoover admitted, w^as a two-edged sword that combined federal branch banking and a federal deposit guarantee.
INITIAL FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS aimed at banking reform sought to extend the federal deposit guarantee to national, but not state-chartered barJcs. It had long been suggested that "the National Banking System should be buttressed against times of stress by means of a Deposit-Guarantee Reserve." Such a reserve would stand as a "GUARANTEE of every dollar deposited in each and every national bank throughout the country" and immunize them from failure.'' Depositors in state-chartered banks, however, would not be similarly protected. Further, the proposal would have outraged state bankers associations, whose members were mostly state banks. Frank Wamer, secretary of the IBA, believed that there was another way to both ensure depositor confidence in banks and circumvent a deposit guarantee. Wamer could embrace federal intervention only if the autonomy of the Iowa state and national banking systems could be preserved. , 36 He pointed out to Iowa Congressman C. W. Ramseyer, a member of the House Ways and Means Committee, that "bank failvires result from loss of public confidence, often generated by a foolish or malicious word spoken on the street."" The IBA had lobbied the Iowa legislature in 1929 to pass a "false rumors agairwt banks" bill to protect its state-chartered banks. In December 1930 a similar bill was pending before Congress." Idle gossip or slanderous remarks could then be pvinishable by federal law. Such legislation was intended to deter bank panics, enforce confidence, and put a halt to bank runs. Congressman Ramseyer wovdd have none of it. Such legislation, he thought, was the responsibility of each state, not the federal govenunent. Wamer countered his objections by citing the exam^ple of a mirüster ("of all people who would become embittered against a bank charged by law to protect the depositors"), who was turned down on a small loan at a barJ< in northeast Iowa, took a train to Minnesota, and mailed 20 anonjonous typewritten letters to merchants in the Iowa town claiming that the bank was unsafe. On the day the letters arrived, depositors withdrew about $10,000 from the town's banks.^' Wamer believed that if individual bank panics could be checked, Iowa bank failures would be reduced or eliminated. Moreover, perhaps such legislation would continue to deter consideration of branch banking and the deposit guarantee, both of w^hich the IBA opposed. The ABA and state bankers associations vigorously opposed the Steagall Bill, arguing that good banks would be taxed to pay for the bad, that banking skill wovild be taxed to pay for incompetence, and that knowledge of banking would be made to pay for the mistakes of ignorance. The IBA Legislative Comnüttee reported that "while the bill has passed the House, there is little likelihood of it being given further consideration by the Senate." Aside from its cost, the IBA opposed the Steagall Bill because of the "disastrous results that occurred in the eight states that enacted similar legislation for their state banks"; because the bill would have required state-chartered Iowa banks to join the Federal Reserve System, where membership and requirement^ "may be changed by others living away and apart from the State of Iowa"; because Iowa's hundreds of local banks could not possibly benefit "from a plan outside of the State" and in which "Iowa banks incorporated under Iowa State Laws could never hope to have a voice"; and because a federal guarantee of bank deposits would undermine the autonomy of Iowa's state banking system.''^ Thanks to the opposition of Senator Carter Glass (D-VA), 43 an acknowledged "father" of the Federal Reserve System-reinforced by Fresident Hoover, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Banks, and the New York money-center banks that abhorred the idea of bailing out failed farm banks in the South and West-the bill was not about to move.
Senator Glass had his own agenda for bank reform in 1932. His bill would have permitted a national bank not only unlimited branches within its home dty, but statewide and even in adjacent states up to 50 miles from its headquarters. Wamer and the IBA Legislative Cormnittee were outraged. In a scathing memorandiun to Iowa's two senators and eleven House representatives, he railed that "if this biU is passed, deference to state sovereignty has been eliminated." He fervently hoped that no one wished to see "'octopus' banking in your home state that may throttle the very existence of the hundreds of independent Iowa banks. "^' Clearly, the IBA perceived the "octopus" of intra-and interstate branch banking as a huge threat to the state's banking system.
The banking catastrophes of 1931 that provoked the Glass and Steagall Bills in 1932 marked a turning point in the focus of the IBA. The focus was no longer on Iowa legislation for Iowa banks; rather, the IBA was forced to consider pending federal legislation that threatened Iowa's state banking system. If that legislation were to pass, Wamer foresaw that federally chartered banks would gain a competitive advantage over state-chartered banks when it came to branching. Likewise, state-chartered banks would also be disadvantaged if only Federal Reserve System member banks were eligible for the federal deposit guarantee."Â s state banking systems came under increasing attack, the IBA resisted federal proposals that would have undermined the state banking system. Some IBA members believed that the Federal Reserve envisioned a unified banking system that would eliminate state banks. At the same time, banks also faced the threat of "the pernicious guaranty bill."'^ Ferhaps, some pro- posed, some compromise on branch barücing might remove the heat generated by bank failures. John Pole, the U.S. Comptroller, highlighting the dilemma between the federal deposit guarantee and expanded branch banking, told the House Banking Committee that he favored "a system of branch banking built up around strong city banks operating under close goverriment supervision." While he covdd not deny that the Steagall Bill would provide greater safety to the depositor, he could not accept a federal govemment guarantee of some $40 billion in bank deposits. He concluded that "a general [federal] guaranty of bank deposits is tbe very antitbesis of branch banking."'"
By mid-year 1932, Congress and Hoover administration officials, like ¿be nation's bankers, were gridlocked on expanded branch banking and the federal deposit guarantee. President Hoover unequivocally opposed the guarantee and had misgivings about expanded branch banking. He knew that most of the nation's bankers and state barücers associations were vehemently opposed to both. When Congress adjourned in July 1932, branch banking and the federal deposit guarantee were left unresolved.
When the lame-duck Congress returned in December, the fireworks began again. No fewer than 18 deposit insurance bills were introduced in the Senate. The Steagall Bill, which restricted the federal deposit guarantee to Federal Reserve member banks only, continued to attract the most serious attention. Its passage, argued Hajmes McFadden, secretary of the Georgia Bankers Associafion, would mean "the wholesale slaughter of small [state-chartered] banks" as federally guaranteed banks "would siphon all of the deposits out of the non-guaranteed banks which would automafically perish." Anficipafing that the Steagall Deposit Guarantee Bill wovdd be combined with the Glass Branch Banking Bill, McFadden asked Frank Warner to send "three or four of your hardest hitters" to Washington to "belly up to your own Senators and Congressmen if the crisis occurs." °4 Wamer confirmed that an IBA committee would indeed be sent to Washington to lobby against the bills if necessary. He knew that his members, like McFadden's in Georgia, almost unanimously opposed the deposit guarantee. First, most IBA member banks were state-chartered and were not Federal Reserve members. Second, the proposed cost of deposit insurance -2 percent of deposits payable to a federal guaranty fund in order to be eligible-^was staggering. Third, banks pointed to the failure of prior state bank insurance schemes, without exception. Yet if deposits in federally chartered banks were insured, what other choice would state-chartered banks have but to form their own state insurance fund in order to remain competitive?^' Fovirth, bankers resented using a federal mechanism to bail out their weaker brethren. Fifth, they were fearful of any legislative attempt to tie a federal deposit guarantee to the Glass provision that would allow Federal Reserve member banks to branch across state lines. Either way-federal guarantee or interstate branch banking-state-chartered banks would lose. Either way would jeopardize the role and existence of state banking systems, and Frank Wamer of the IBA was not going to let it happen if he covild help it.
ON JANUARY 19,1933, federal legislation became secondary because of a small banking panic that triggered the failure of 26 Iowa banks in 24 hours.'^ After Roosevelt had defeated Hoover in the November 1932 election, bank failures in Iowa had accelerated and farm prices had declined to their lowest level of the year (6 cents per bushel of com at elevators in northwest Iowa). As Wamer put it, "something heroic" needed to be done to contain depositor stampedes."
With banks falling like dominoes, officers of the IBA and the State Banking Department hurriedly crafted a bill, rushed it 51. Wamer awkwardly noted, "This brings us to the point that it might not be unlikely that it might be well to consider the setting up of a 'Guaranty of Deposits' system here in this state and submitting sudi a bill to the General Assembly when it meets next August, 1933 Proceedings, 1933,247. through the Iowa House and Senate, and got it signed by the governor, all in six hours on January 20, 1933. The Iowa Bank Conservation Act established in law a practice that the IBA had insfituted the previous July as a result of a ten-county banking panic. Voluntary "Depositor's Agreements" between a bank and depositors gave banks the option to restrict deposit withdrawals for a specific period. The goal was to buy time, avoid a bar\k receivership, and restore public confidence. The "trusteeship provision" in Depositor's Agreements had first been tried in November 1932. It was offered to depositors as an altemative to failure. Slow^ and frozen assets were removed from the bank and turned over to trustees, or conservators, "to be liquidated as, if, and when it would be in the best interests of depositors." The bank agreed to divert all earnings usually for three years, and depositors agreed that the trustees could limit withdrawals and deposit interest rates.'^ When the Iowa BarJ< Conservafion Act instituted the trusteeship provisions of the Depositor's Agreements into law, it salvaged state banking by permitting a state-chartered bank that otherwise would have failed to continue to function as a depository. Because the law had originated as Senate File 111, barJ<s that were forced to use it became known as "one-eleven" banks.
Of a total of about 1,400 national and state-chartered banks in Iowa in 1925, 802 remained by mid-February 1933. About 10 percent operated as "one-eleven" banks, with 50 or so located in north central and northwest Iowa, where farm mortgage foreclosures provoked farmer militancy.'^ The number of one-eleven banks would escalate dramafically despite the governor's call for a moratorium on farm foreclosures. In the wake of the Iowa law's success, Frank Wamer was swamped with dozens of requests from other states for information about the law, which became an accepted altemafive to bank closings, and he was not have been resurrected to become part of the reopening of the banks later in March. '' In just three weeks between mid-February and President Roosevelt's bank closing proclamation on March 6, 1933, more than half of all Iowa banks became one-eleven banks. Had, there been no one-eleven legislation, failed banks would have outnumbered surviving bariks and severely impaired the state banking system. The Iowa Bank Superintendent insisted that his department was going to reorganize all of the one-eleven banks, and that every bank that opened better be sound, "because, my friends, we do not want to go through this experience ever again." By mid-1934 almost every one of the one-eleven banks had been released by their conservators. The IBA was proud to claim that "there are very few homes or farms that are as much as 30 minutes away from a barüc."* The closing and opening of the bardes by mid-March, followed by the unprecedented flurry of federal legislation, told Iowa bankers that Roosevelt's New Deal had assumed a life and momentum of its own. The Steagall Deposit Guarantee Bill had passed the House in 1932 by an overwhelming margin. The Glass Branch Banking Bill, despite the Long filibuster, had been rammed through the Senate in January. By April 1933 the Glass and Steagall Bills had been combined on the legislative calendar. All that remained was reconciliation of the branch barJdng and deposit guarantee issues.
Because the banking crisis had brought the new Congress into extraordinary session, and because Congress had dealt with omnibus legislation for industry, agriculture, and the un-59. Elmus Wicker criticizes state legislation that "was drafted and passed at breakneck speed" and "allowed (Governors and state banking officials to dose all banks within a state, limit deposit withdrawals, or allow directors of individual banks to declare temporary moratoria and limit withdrawals." It was true that "each state reacted to protect its own interests without regard to its effect on others," and this. To state bankers and their associafions, the great unknown was Roosevelt himself. The president probably could have had about anything he wanted when it came to banldng. Carter Glass and Harry Steagall notwithstanding. Roosevelt, the public perceived, had "saved" the banks, calmed the public's anxiefies, engineered the reopenings, and gotten the coimtry moving posifively once again. Warner thought that Roosevelt was "at least 'lukewarm' if not opposed to anything savoring of the guaranty of bank deposits or to any provision that would destroy the unit bank or interfere with state Banking within its own border." Warner knew that "such discussion touches upon very vital issues," depending on the form of the combined bill."
The "very vital" issues boiled down to the survival of each state's banking system. Dependent on the system of statechartered hanks in Iowa and every other state were, of course, the state bankers associafions, state banking departments, trade joumal publishers, advisory firms, and related suppliers. Statechartered banks would not be able to compete effecfively, given the privileges pending for Federal Reserve member banks only. A reducfion in their numbers, if not extincfion, seemed inevitable.
Sn\all banking interests shuddered when in May 1933 the Glass Bill, amended again, provided that no bank could obtain the deposit guarantee urüess it was a Federal Reserve member. The Steagall Bill, also amended again, provided that all banks were eligible, but only with minimum capital of $50,000. Iowa barücers saw the bills as a threat to the system of state banking, as "giants intended to slaughter the small rural bank and install some form of [branch] banking or federal unificafion removed from the 48 states."" When Roosevelt signed the Glass-Steagall Bill, or "Banking Act of 1933," in June, the deposit guarantee of $2,500 per account was, of course, incorporated-for all banks. The final legislafion required that state-chartered banks join the Federal Reserve System within two years, but this was later eliminated. Second, the minimum capital requirement was reduced to $25,000, although state banks were subject to examinafion by the new Federal Deposit Insurance Corporafion. Federal Reserve member banks were prohibited from branching where state law prohibited state banks from doing so. From the perspective of Iowa bankers-and most of the nation's independent vinit barü<ers-the above provisions were the only ones that made a strategic difference to the industry.
Roosevelt's Farm Relief Act, combined with revamping the federal credit system to create the new Farm Credit Administrafion, resulted in more money fiowing to agriculture than at any fime since World War I. Total deposits in Iowa banks increased by $60 million in 1933-1934. Ironically, the federal deposit guarantee was undoubtedly the most important factor in ensuring the survival of small rural banks. Iowa alone in 1934 had 475 towns with a popvdation of fewer than 1,000 served by a unit bank." It is inconceivable that all 475 banks covild have svirvived the depression of the 1930s without the federal guarantee and without more than the few bank failures that were experienced after mid-1933.
The federal deposit guarantee was the single most important banking reform to emerge from the legacy of the Hoover administration and Roosevelt's first one hvmdred days of legislation.'' State-chartered bankers knew that the deposit guarantee had become entangled with branch banking. To permit only Federal 64. IBA Proceedings, 1934,117. 65. See Friedman and Schwarz, Monetary History of the U.S., 434, who state that "federal insurance of bank deposits was the most important structural 'change to result from the 1933 panic, and, indeed in our view, the structural change most conducive to monetary stability since state bank notes were taxed out of existence immediately after the Civil War." Unlike the demise of state banks that resulted from their notes being "taxed out of existence," the deposit guarantee was intended to preserve both systems of banks-state-chartered banks and national banks-and the stability of barJs deposits on which Federal Reserve System monetary policy is based.
Reserve member banks to receive either the deposit guarantee or the right to expanded branch banking woxild have meant that state banks could not have been compefitive. Once Congress approved the deposit guarantee for state banks, the legislation moved qviickly.
Still, it was resisted by barücers of all stripes, including Iowa's state-chartered bankers. H. J. Stuhlmiller, cashier of the State Savings Barüc of Fontanelle, wondered about the guarantee and whether, after a year of operafion in 1934, enough was enough. He suggested to fellow Iowa bankers that Congress had "diagnosed the case of banking and told us we were sick." Perhaps a dose or two of FDIC insurance premiums was advisable-"but like all powerful drugs it lurks with danger, and I honestly fear the outcome unless we wake up from this lethargy and shake this off."" Stuhlmiller anficipated the deposit insurance crisis of the 1980s by about fifty years. His grandchildren would witness the virtual demise of Üie savings and loan industry and the preservation of both state and nafional banking systems. Federal limitafions on both intrastate and interstate branch banking unfil 1997 ensured that state-chartered banks in the unit bariking states could preserve their territorial monopolies except front local compefifion. If state-chartered banks in the unit banking states could survive, so, too, would state banking departments and state bankers associafions.
FRANK WARNER and his fellow Iowa unit bank members fought to preserve the Iowa state banking system when both banks and the economy deteriorated rapidly. The state of Iowa epitomized the two sickest and most threatened industries in the Urüted States from 1930 to 1933: barüdng and agriculture. The struggle to preserve both began early in the 1920s when the symptoms of their illness first became apparent. During the later years of the Hoover presidency, the Iowa state barJdng system teetered on collapse. By March 1933, it was essenfially bankrupt. The chief results of desperate measures were the insfigafion of Depositors Agreements and bank trusteeships; the 66. IBA Proceedings, 1934,149. federal deposit guarantee that included state banks; the limitation on Federal Reserve member banks branching both intrastate and interstate; and the preservation of state banking systems. The wonder is that the Iowa banking system even svirvived the federal battles to win their struggle for state banking autonomy.
